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ABSTRACT. The political situation of the Arctic still remains unstable. In the past decade, a combination of the specific 
regulations of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and the phenomenon of Arctic ice-cover shrinkage have produced a 
significant increase in the political activity of some of the countries interested in the region. It is commonly thought that the 
roots of the Arctic conflict lie in the abundant mineral resources, particularly petroleum and natural gas, that lie under the 
Arctic seabed. By analyzing geological data on the location of oil deposits and by taking into account the technological and 
macroeconomic conditions that must be fulfilled in order to exploit them, it is possible to conclude that the exploitation of these 
deposits will most likely not be attempted in the areas under dispute in the coming decades. This conclusion suggests that the 
motives behind the Arctic conflict are political, and not economic.
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RÉSUMÉ. À ce jour, la situation politique de l’Arctique demeure instable. Cette dernière décennie, les règlements spécifiques 
découlant de la Convention sur le droit de la mer, alliés au phénomène de la diminution de la couverture de glace arctique, 
se sont traduits par une activité politique considérablement accrue de la part de certains des pays intéressés par la région. 
On pense généralement que le conflit de l’Arctique est attribuable aux ressources minérales abondantes qui se trouvent sous 
le plancher océanique de l’Arctique, plus particulièrement le pétrole et le gaz naturel. À la lumière de l’analyse des données 
géologiques portant sur l’emplacement des gisements de pétrole et des conditions technologiques et macroéconomiques 
devant être remplies pour les exploiter, il est possible de conclure qu’il faudra vraisemblablement plusieurs décennies avant 
que l’exploitation de ces gisements ne soit entreprise dans les régions visées par le conflit. On en conclut donc que les motifs 
derrière le conflit de l’Arctique sont de nature politique, et non pas économique.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic expanse is one of the few areas on earth whose 
legal status has yet to be determined conclusively. The Law 
of the Sea Convention (UN, 1982) limited in both time and 
space the possibility of claiming sovereign rights to Arctic 
resources. In the first decade of this century, the interested 
countries have heightened their activity, striving to high-
light their presence in the Arctic and prove the legitimacy 
of their claims to unrestricted exploitation of their respec-
tive areas. The expected shrinking of the Arctic polar ice 
cap is an additional incentive for increased interest, as 
theoretically it could facilitate access to resources that are 
assumed to be located under the Arctic seabed.
The primary goal of this paper is to verify the extent to 
which the acquisition of exclusive rights to the exploitation 
of Arctic mineral resources is the true motive for the actions 
that are being undertaken by the countries competing in the 
race for the Arctic, as they themselves declare. The study 
widely analyses provisions of the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and gives particular attention to the perceived surge 
in the political activity of several countries. The economic 
and technological conditions for the extraction of petroleum 
from underneath the ocean floor of the Arctic are an addi-
tional point of reference, and the results of geological stud-
ies on the extent of the Arctic oil reserves are confronted 
with the claims of the competing states.
THE ARCTIC ON THE POLITICAL MAP
OF THE WORLD
The polar regions are among the least-explored and least-
penetrated parts of the earth. The fact that their exploration 
began relatively late does much to explain the assumption, 
particularly popular in medieval Europe, that a hypothetical 
stretch of land conventionally referred to as Terra Australis 
Incognita existed in the south. Europe’s understanding of 
where landmasses were located in the north polar regions 
was only slightly more advanced. Although the oldest signs 
of Viking settlement on Greenland are estimated to date 
from the 10th century AD, Mercator’s Polus Arcticus cum 
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vicinis regionibus map (Hondius, 1625), still shows the 
North Pole surrounded by four islands roughly the size of 
Greenland (Fig. 1). Today, our insight on the Arctic is sub-
stantially greater than it was centuries ago. We no longer 
have doubts regarding the existence, location, dimensions, 
or even political status of the individual landmasses that 
lie in the “Far North”; however, there is still disagreement 
about jurisdiction in some maritime zones. 
From a geographical-political standpoint, five countries 
possess territories that lie within the region: Russia, Nor-
way, Denmark, Canada, and the United States. The politi-
cal involvement of Denmark—and, to a certain extent, 
Norway—in the Arctic is special in nature. Danish legisla-
tion stipulates that Greenland is an integral part of the ter-
ritorial possessions of Denmark; since 1979, however, the 
island has enjoyed far-reaching and continually widening 
autonomy with respect to its European proprietor. A good 
measure of the sovereignty and competence of the Green-
landic government was the withdrawal of the country from 
the European Communities in 1985, the only such case 
in the history of the European Union (Anon., 1985, 2011; 
Sobczyński, 2006). Norway’s presence in the Arctic is nota-
ble on the Svalbard Archipelago, a Norwegian dependency 
that also has a special status. Norway is in full political 
control of the administration of the archipelago by virtue 
of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920, with each of the 39 con-
tracting parties reserving the right, among others, to set-
tlement and economic activity on the islands (Sobczyński, 
2006).
THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN
The first claims to possession of the Arctic Ocean were 
made more than 100 years ago. In a 1907 speech to the 
Canadian Senate, P. Poirier suggested dividing the Arc-
tic into sectors (McRae, 1994), and in 1925, Canada offi-
cially claimed the sector between 60˚ and 141˚ W (Atlas of 
Canada, 2009; Kubiak, 2009). The proposed sectors were 
to have the North Pole as their common tip, their latitudi-
nal boundaries would be defined by meridians connecting 
the Pole to the westernmost and easternmost points of the 
respective states, and their base would run along the coun-
tries’ shorelines (Kubiak, 2009). Had this division been 
accepted, Russia would have received the largest portion 
of the Arctic Ocean, while another significant percent-
age would have come under the jurisdiction of Canada, the 
party that originally submitted the plan. The project did 
FIG. 1. Mercator’s map of the Arctic (version published by Jodocus Hondius, 1625). 
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not meet with universal international approval, primarily 
because it assumed that the contested area would be allo-
cated only to the few countries whose parts were located in 
the Arctic (Jaworski, 2009).
An alternative approach, at present widely recognized on 
the international political stage (UN, 2011), proposes that 
the Arctic region be subject to the provisions of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-
LOS), popularly known as the Law of the Sea Convention. 
This seminal document, signed after several decades of 
international negotiations, was the first to outline the legal 
status of marine areas. It distinguishes between 11 catego-
ries of waters, of which five in particular are of special rel-
evance to the Arctic: territorial sea, exclusive economic 
zones (EEZs), continental shelf, international waters (high 
seas), and in the area beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, the seabed and ocean floor (UN, 1982).
A coastal state’s territorial waters stretch from its base-
line, which is defined as the water line farthest from shore 
at low tide, to a point located no more than 12 nautical 
miles into the body of water (UN, 1982: Articles 3, 5, 6, 7); 
this marine area is considered by law to be an integral part 
of the country’s territory. Apart from the ongoing debate on 
the political status of the Northwest Passage and the North-
ern Sea Route, the extent of the territorial waters in the 
Arctic is generally not in question. One exception is Hans 
Island, located in the Nares Strait between Greenland and 
Ellesmere Island, exactly halfway across the width of the 
strait, which at that point measures approximately 30 km. 
Geologically speaking, the island is the topmost part of the 
glacial polish, with a surface of just 1.3 km2 of bedrock 
(ICJ, 2008). Since 1933, Denmark and Canada have been 
involved in a territorial dispute regarding Hans Island, 
though neither expects any economic benefits whatsoever if 
the deadlock is resolved. The island has no strategic impor-
tance either. Even so, both countries treat the issue of Hans 
Island with extreme seriousness, a fact that has not escaped 
comment on the part of politically conscious citizens. One 
of the more interesting grassroots initiatives to arise from 
this situation is the creation of a website for a fictional 
organization calling itself the Hans Island Liberation Front 
(2010), a platform that enables any and all visitors to give 
their opinions on undertakings of their governments with 
respect to the Hans Island case. 
The exclusive economic zones, along with the conti-
nental shelf recognized by the Law of the Sea Convention, 
include marine areas that extend to 200 nautical miles from 
the baseline. In the event that the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin extends beyond that, the continental shelf 
can be expanded up to the undersea break where the con-
tinental margin ends, but may not surpass a total width 
of 350 nautical miles from the baseline. According to the 
Convention, the 350 nautical mile limit “does not apply to 
submarine elevations that are natural components of the 
continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks 
and spurs” (Article 76, Section 6). The state that possesses 
the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf enjoys 
exclusive rights to the economic exploitation of the sea 
zone, which includes rights to fishing and exploitation of 
deep-water and seabed resources, while recognizing that all 
other states have complete freedom of movement for their 
vessels within the EEZ, as well as the right to extend pipe-
lines and lay submarine cables there (UN, 1982: Articles 56 
and 58). The actual extent of the EEZ and continental shelf 
of any given country is the root of many international con-
flicts, given the potential economic benefits in play (Fig. 2).
International waters (high seas) allow all vessels com-
plete freedom of navigation and freedom to realize any 
form of commercial or economic activity (UN, 1982: Arti-
cle 87). Because the provisions noted in Article 89 automat-
ically preclude any claim to high seas, only the expansion 
of a state’s continental shelf—and therefore the reclaiming 
of part of the international waters—can guarantee exclusive 
exploitation rights for that state in the reclaimed area.
The Law of the Sea Convention places seabed and ocean 
floor areas that are outside any exclusive economic zone 
under special protection. According to the “common her-
itage of mankind” principle, the jurisdiction of these areas 
and the exploitation of minerals located under their seabed 
are inalienable rights of all countries, regardless of their 
geographic location (UN, 1982: Preamble, Articles 136 and 
137). As in the case of international waters, only a change 
in the boundaries of a continental shelf can give a coastal 
country the exclusive rights to exploit the resources that lie 
underneath the seabed outside its exclusive economic zone.
DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
It is doubtful that the near-universal recognition of the 
Law of the Sea Convention will put an end to existing 
rivalries and check future conflicts. The reason is a cer-
tain openness to interpretation and subjectivity inherent 
in some of the Convention’s points, particularly Article 76, 
which refers to the continental shelf. As mentioned previ-
ously, a wider-than-average continental margin warrants 
the expansion of the continental shelf, as defined in the 
Law of the Sea Convention, up to more than 350 nautical 
miles from the baseline. In order to secure this right, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that a part of the ocean floor pre-
viously regarded as not belonging to a continental margin 
does indeed form part of it. The Law of the Sea Convention 
allows a signatory state a period of 10 years after it ratifies 
the Convention to provide such evidence (UN, 1982: Annex 
II, Article 4).
As of 20 September 2011, the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion has been signed by 157 states, some of which have yet 
to carry out the internal ratification process (UN, 2011). Of 
the five states directly involved in the dispute in the Arctic, 
four have signed and ratified the Convention: Norway (in 
1996), Russia (1997), Canada (2003), and Denmark (2004). 
The United States is among the several dozen countries that 
to this day have neither signed nor ratified the Convention. 
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Thus the United States does not have to consider itself 
bound by the laws of the Convention, although various U.S. 
institutions have acted in accordance with it. Meanwhile, the 
countdown to the end of the 10-year period allotted for the 
four Arctic signatories to prove their right to a given marine 
area began with their respective dates of ratification; in the 
cases of Norway and Russia, it is already over.
One of the most notable direct consequences of the 
expiring time limit was the clear invigoration of the four 
countries’ political activity. In 2001, Russia announced that 
the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea mountain range that 
runs across the seabed between the New Siberian Islands 
and Ellesmere Island and passes close to the geographic 
North Pole, is a geological prolongation of the Eurasian 
shelf (Hołdys, 2006). This fact, it was argued, would enable 
Russia to extend its continental shelf to more than 350 nau-
tical miles and simultaneously give the country exclusive 
rights to the economic exploitation of that area. The Rus-
sians presented evidence supporting that theory to the Com-
mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. However, 
before Russia managed to compile sufficient additional data 
to confirm the thesis, Canada and Denmark made a joint 
counter-declaration (2006). They postulated instead that 
the Lomonosov Ridge is actually a prolongation of North 
America, which, if proven, would grant the right to a sig-
nificant portion of the Arctic to those two nations (Hołdys, 
2006; see also Howden and Holst, 2005).
The Lomonosov Ridge cuts diagonally across the bot-
tom of the Arctic Ocean. The dilemma regarding which 
continent the formation belongs to can be resolved only by 
resorting to historical geology. Most contemporary investi-
gations conclude that the Lomonosov Ridge separated from 
Eurasia some 57 to 58 million years ago, having indeed pre-
viously comprised part of the continental margin (Heezen 
and Ewing, 1961; Jokat, 2005). That said, the implications 
this conclusion has for the current claims of each state 
involved remain to be determined. Under the Law of the 
Sea Convention, the fact that a given area was a part of one 
of the continents in the distant geological past has no bear-
ing on its current standing; the crux of the matter is whether 
or not the Lomonosov Ridge is part of the continental mar-
gin today. Using historical geology as a valid argument in 
the discussion on the shelf’s status is about as convincing as 
arguing that Madagascar belongs to Mozambique, and for 
similar reasons.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC
IN RECENT YEARS
Another surge of political activity took place in 2007, 
the year of Russia’s deadline for submitting claims relating 
to national and transnational waters under the Law of the 
Sea Convention. One event that marked this renewed activ-
ity was the sending of a Russian scientific expedition, Ark-
tika 2007, to the North Pole. Its commander-in-chief, Artur 
Chilingarov, stated that “the Arctic is Russian. ...We must 
prove the North Pole is an extension of the Russian coastal 
shelf” (Reynolds, 2007). The following day, a Russian flag 
made of titanium was planted on the bottom of the Arctic 
seabed, exactly on the North Pole. This act was a symbolic 
claim to possession of the heart of the Arctic for Russia. 
Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued a statement 
according to which its analysis of the sediments found on 
the North Pole’s ocean floor confirmed the hypothesis, for-
mulated earlier, that from a geological point of view, the 
Lomonosov Ridge belonged to Eurasia (Kijewski, 2009).
This declaration triggered an immediate reaction on 
the part of several other states. On 7 August 2007, Canada 
announced a mobilization of its armed forces and readiness 
for military maneuvers, while the prime minister of Can-
ada made a visit to the Canadian Arctic, declaring plans to 
increase the nation’s economic and military activity in the 
Far North. The United States responded by sending one of 
its icebreakers to the Arctic (Kaługa, 2009). In 2008, the 
European Commission demonstrated its concern with the 
situation by way of a communication entitled “The Euro-
pean Union and the Arctic Region,” the importance of 
which lies in its being one of the first steps toward a com-
mon European Union strategy with respect to the Arctic 
(EC, 2008). However, the EU still shows relatively little 
political interest in the High North (Offerdal, 2010).
Currently, Russian and Canadian military patrols have 
made their presence in the Arctic more conspicuous, 
and the issue of Arctic rights has gained notoriety in the 
increasing number of documents pertaining to the right 
each country has to the region. At the same time, a greater 
incidence of topics related to the Arctic has been noted in 
political discourse. One of the most significant documents 
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is the Arctic strategy of Russia, published in 2009 by the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation (Kaługa, 2009). 
Among the policies it contains is a statement that “given the 
strong competition over access to natural resources, the use 
of military force as a means of resolving problems cannot 
be discounted in situations where the balance of power near 
the borders of Russia and its allies is threatened” (Kaługa, 
2009). In 2009, NATO called attention to the need for a col-
lective strategy with regard to the Arctic, which immedi-
ately prompted the vocal disapproval of the Russian side 
(Kaługa, 2009).
In May of 2008, an international conference took place 
in Ilulissat, Greenland, with high-ranking participants 
from each of the five states vying for influence in the Arc-
tic. The resulting declaration gives hope for an end in sight 
to the debate on the future political division of the Arctic: 
“We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive 
international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (The 
Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). The attendees also resolved to 
continue talks on the subject with special regard for the pro-
visions of the Law of the Sea Convention, in spite of the 
fact that one of the sides—the United States—has yet to 
sign and ratify the Convention. This decision is in line with 
the European Union and the Arctic Region communica-
tion, which asserts the exclusion of the North Pole from any 
claims and underlines the importance of handling conflicts 
through the Law of the Sea Convention (EC, 2008).
THE ARCTIC’S NATURAL RESOURCES
All of the states competing for the Arctic state clearly 
and unambiguously that the deposits of mineral resources 
lying dormant under the Arctic Ocean’s seabed are the 
main motivation behind their attempts to seize the largest 
possible piece of the Arctic pie (Beauchamp and Huebert, 
2008; Kijewski, 2009; Osica, 2010). The President of Rus-
sia, Dmitry Medvedev, has stated his intention to transform 
the Arctic into the Russian resource base of the 21st century 
and expressed his belief that “there are obvious attempts to 
limit Russia’s access to the exploitation of deposits located 
in the Arctic” (Anon., 2010). Many scholars have backed 
up this outline of the country’s commercial and economic 
interests in articles on the Arctic dispute. Jaworski (2009) 
thinks that the basic source of conflict between countries 
in the Arctic region is their desire for access to areas with 
abundant natural resources.
The generalized conviction that the Arctic is particu-
larly abundant in natural resources, especially oil and 
natural gas, found strong support in the results of a study 
conducted by American geologists (Bird et al., 2008). The 
complex methods used by these researchers allowed them 
to estimate that the area to the north of the Arctic Circle is 
likely to contain approximately 90 billion barrels of crude 
oil and 47 trillion m3 of natural gas, as well as diamonds, 
nickel, lead and other resources. The scientists’ comments 
emphasize the importance of the study’s findings: “The 
extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geo-
graphically largest unexplored prospective area for petro-
leum remaining on Earth” (Bird et al., 2008). Should the 
estimates provided by this geological investigation prove 
accurate, the economic value of the Arctic would be tre-
mendous, as the tentative, theoretical deposits of Arctic nat-
ural gas mentioned above constitute 27% of all estimated 
undiscovered hydrocarbon resources. 
PEAK OIL AND ARCTIC OIL EXPLOITATION
Resource potency is one of the deciding factors in claim-
ing economic and political success in the world. This 
hypothesis particularly applies to today’s universally cov-
eted energy resources and to those countries whose econ-
omies depend largely on the exportation of raw resources. 
Two of the five countries engaged in the Arctic scramble, 
Norway and Russia, derive a significant part of their export 
value from the sale of natural resources. Throughout the 
past decade, crude oil and natural gas together made up 
approximately 55% of total export value for Norway and 
51% for Russia (WTO, 2010; see also Statistics Norway, 
2009). Stockpiling raw resources and expanding their exist-
ing volume is therefore of the utmost importance for both 
countries in terms of ensuring continued financial support 
for their economic development.
Speculation on how the world’s available supply of crude 
oil will change in the coming decades has long been kept in 
an alarmist tone. The 1970s produced some of the first fatal-
istic predictions of global economic and humanitarian catas-
trophes that allegedly awaited mankind before the end of 
the century as a result of definitive depletion of basic energy 
resources. Reports prepared for the Club of Rome, a global 
think tank founded in 1968, were especially pessimistic 
(Meadows et al., 1972). In the 1980s, the predicted date of 
complete oil depletion was moved forward; Enz (1981) esti-
mated that the wells would dry up in 2022. Indeed, even 
today, most reports seem to imply there is only enough oil 
to go around for the next several decades at most, one cited 
date of depletion being 2049 (Craig et al., 2003).
Evidently, with time, despite the steadily rising figures 
for worldwide oil extraction, the final depletion date is sys-
tematically being postponed. Many bleak and pessimistic 
studies that have surfaced in recent years draw their con-
clusions from the observation of two main variables. The 
first is the price of oil worldwide. Before the year 2000, the 
nominal value of a barrel of Brent crude, the most impor-
tant benchmark for oil prices, had barely exceeded $30, 
whereas a few years later, in mid-2008, it reached the previ-
ously unheard-of sum of almost $150. The rise in oil prices 
is understood as an economic consequence of the supply 
and demand laws, which stipulate that an increase in the 
price of a commodity is a measure of that commodity’s 
increasing scarcity. 
The second meaningful variable is the production rate of 
oil extracted around the world and in each country, figures 
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that can be represented graphically by Hubbert curves 
(Hubbert, 1956). The model posits that because existing 
reserves are finite, each area of exploitation is doomed to 
reach a peak rate of extraction. The current Hubbert curve 
of world petroleum production rates suggests that the peak 
rate was either reached in 2008 or will be reached within 
the next two to three years. It is useful to note, however, 
that the authors of the Hubbert curve, published 10 years 
ago, predicted that maximum production would be attained 
in 2005, and if we follow previous predictions farther back 
in time, we find a corresponding downward trend toward 
earlier peak oil dates (see Smil, 2006). The curves continue 
to be published regularly, regardless, and they are often 
dispatched with accompanying comments and predictions 
whose general mood is best conveyed by Figure 3.
Despite relentless scientific research that aims to replace 
fossil fuels with renewable sources of energy, attempts to 
provide a renewable future have yielded few results, and 
the world continues to depend largely on non-renewable 
resources. Nonetheless, as we are currently unable to esti-
mate with confidence exactly when petroleum will turn into 
a raw commodity of marginal significance, the stated goal 
of many states is to accumulate the largest possible sup-
ply of oil in case it turns out to be the basis of the world’s 
economy in the coming years. One of the most important 
catalysts for such actions is undoubtedly the shrinking of 
the Arctic ice sheet. It is widely believed, also within politi-
cal fora like the European Parliament, that a reduction in 
the extent of permanent ice will spur the exploitation of the 
ocean floor for natural resources (EP, 2010). The Far North 
nations expect to reap even more of the profit through the 
activation of potential trade routes running along the north-
ern coasts of North America and Asia. The Northwest Pas-
sage would shorten the road from northwestern Europe to 
eastern Asia by several thousand kilometers in comparison 
to the Panama Canal route, while the Northern Sea Route 
(Northeast Passage) would similarly unseat the Suez Canal 
route as the preferred route to the Far East (Jaworski, 2009).
In estimating the volume of extant petroleum depos-
its and other resources that could come within reach of the 
Arctic pretenders in the near future, it is advisable to exer-
cise extreme caution. The research conducted by the U.S. 
Geological Survey was the first to be carried out on such a 
wide scale and was intended, to a large extent, to pave the 
way for future endeavors. The study provided data on the 
probability of encountering a given volume of petroleum in 
selected sectors in the region; it failed, however, to pinpoint 
specific locations and come up with precise quantitative fig-
ures (Bird et al., 2008). Also, the published results indicate 
that the likelihood of finding petroleum in and around the 
central part of the Arctic seabed is close to zero (Fig. 4).
The ocean floor as a whole, and what lies beneath the 
Arctic Ocean in particular, remains notoriously poorly 
researched. This is true for both its geological structure 
and, to a certain degree, the bathymetric relief of the land 
underneath the depths, while our knowledge of some of the 
keystones of the environment, such as the benthic fauna of 
the central zone of the Arctic, is practically non-existent 
(Węsławski, 2010). This state of affairs was perhaps best 
expressed by R.L. Hotz (2007) in the Wall Street Journal: 
“Overall, maps of Mars are about 250 times better than 
maps of earth’s ocean floor.” Given the lack of verifiable 
data, the actual availability of mineral resources in the Arc-
tic may just as well be significantly higher or significantly 
lower than what current estimates might imply. Further 
geological probing of the ocean floor is essential if we want 
a more realistic assessment of Arctic mineral resources and 
their future availability.
Regardless of how much petroleum lies hidden under the 
bottom of the Arctic Ocean, one must realize that its exploi-
tation will be possible only at some future time that is dif-
ficult to anticipate with precision. Fixed offshore platforms 
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have the capacity to drill down to depths no greater than 
1000 m, while semi-submersible rigs can reach down to 
almost 2200 m; the Arctic areas that are the international 
bone of contention, located on either side of the Lomonosov 
Ridge, are significantly deeper (Subsea Oil & Gas Direc-
tory, 2010). The depth of the undersea Makarov Basin 
is more than 3000 m, while that of the Nansen Basin is 
4000 m. The next generation of floating platforms allows 
for extraction of oil from underneath the seabed at a depth 
of 3000 m (Subsea Oil & Gas Directory, 2010). However, 
since the Deepwater Horizon methane explosion on 20 
April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico and the resulting environ-
mental disaster, many plans to exploit previously untapped 
undersea oil deposits using semi-submersible rigs are 
bound to be put on hold.
Even if technological development enables us to begin 
mining the Arctic seabed for petroleum, transporting the oil 
to refineries will require icebreakers to escort the oil tankers 
on each journey (Jaworski, 2009). A feasible alternative to 
this would be to introduce radical structural changes to the 
tankers that would enable them to traverse and navigate the 
ice independently and unaccompanied. It also seems likely 
that technological advances will enable new methods of oil 
exploitation in the foreseeable future, with pipelines located 
on the sea bottom. In each of these cases, the costs of the 
drilling process would rise dramatically. Only if the Arctic 
ice sheet were to completely disintegrate could the costs be 
kept near today’s level; yet numerous contemporary studies 
suggest that complete disintegration will most certainly not 
happen within the next several decades. Research results 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show 
that in the years 2080 – 2100, the average extent of the Arc-
tic Ocean’s ice should decrease by anywhere from 22% to 
33%, depending on the criteria used for the model (Zhang 
and Walsh, 2006; Anisimov et al., 2007). The Arctic would 
then be completely free of sea ice for about 80 days a year 
(Jaworski, 2009).
Technically, it is possible that a time will come when the 
price of oil on the international market will be high enough 
to warrant exploitation of the resources underneath the Arc-
tic Ocean. This situation could arise if demand for crude 
oil should exceed supply by a large margin. An imminent 
increase in demand, it seems, has become an inescapable 
reality: the need for petroleum in the rising markets in 
China and India is rapidly increasing, and the consump-
tion of oil in developed countries is on the rise as well. 
Note, however, that rising demand is continuously curbed 
by a wide range of factors, such as the replacement of one 
resource with another (biofuels), the implementation of 
energy-efficient technologies, and the rising prices of petro-
leum-based products. Supply is also bound to expand for the 
time being, though it is difficult to estimate how long the 
numerous methods of boosting it will keep pace with ris-
ing demand and maintain prices that are lower than the cost 
of drilling in the Arctic. The means of increasing supply 
include, among others, the discovery of new oil reserves, 
innovation and development in seeking out oil deposits and 
information processing, as well as the exploitation of sec-
ondary reserve deposits and less abundant reservoirs.
Similarly, an economic profit-and-loss estimate for natu-
ral gas exploitation could be developed. In addition to the 
factors already mentioned above, the increasing prospects 
for shale gas exploitation in many areas of the world should 
be noted. In some cases, finding new resources may radi-
cally change the situation of their possessors; a leading 
example is the United States, a former importer of natural 
gas that is now covering all its gas-related needs with its 
own exploitation. Surely, increasing supply will help keep 
market prices for gas at relatively low levels, contributing to 
the delay in exploiting the Arctic resources. 
IS OIL BEHIND THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC?
Without petroleum, the economy of today’s world cannot 
exist. Abundance of natural resources is one of the reasons 
for armed conflicts, and crude oil is a star attraction (Le 
Billon, 2001). Nevertheless, it is possible that in the coming 
decades—well before the right technological and economic 
circumstances come into effect for humans to dig into the 
Arctic resources—oil will find itself increasingly marginal-
ized by other sources of energy. In the words of A.Z. Yam-
ani, former Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources, 
“Thirty years from now there will be a huge amount of 
oil—and no buyers. Oil will be left in the ground. The 
Stone Age came to an end, not because we had a lack of 
stones, and the oil age will come to an end not because we 
have a lack of oil” (Fagan, 2000).
Similar statements are upheld by many analysts. Simon 
(1981) argued that price is the simplest and most responsive 
indicator of fluctuations in the volume of a given resource 
available on the market, and that the real prices of oil in 
the world had been falling for years. In the 1996 revision 
of that publication, Simon (1996:6) wrote: “Our supplies 
of natural resources are not finite in any economic sense. 
Nor does past experience give reason to expect natural 
resources to become scarce. Rather, if history is any guide, 
natural resources will progressively become less costly, 
hence less scarce, and will constitute a smaller proportion 
of our expenses in future years.” Simon (1996) supported 
this controversial statement by juxtaposing oil prices to 
average income in the United States, demonstrating that the 
purchasing power of Americans in relation to crude oil has 
quadrupled in the 100 years between 1890 and 1990 (see 
Fig. 5).
Simon’s approach was met with vigorous protest and 
criticism from supporters of the reasoning presented by the 
Club of Rome in its reports and is a prime example of the 
dynamic general equilibrium approach to the analysis of 
mineral resources, which posits that “resources do not pos-
sess a finite amount and are rather a ‘function’ of human 
knowledge” (Fierla, 2005:57). On economic grounds, clas-
sical economists Ricardo (1957) and Mill (1965 – 66) argue 
that physical finiteness of resources does not pose any 
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significant barrier to development, mostly because of pro-
gress in civilization and technology. 
Assuming that the dynamic approach to mineral 
resources is sound, as it seems to be in the face of several 
decades’ worth of encouraging proof, and with a closer look 
at the changes that took place in the structure of energy 
production in the world throughout the 20th century, one 
can venture to claim that human beings might never have to 
resort to the exploitation of Arctic oil. As the age of petro-
leum began, so will it eventually end. This holds true for 
all energy resources. Natural gas, a pivotal energy source 
whose part in primary energy worldwide is rapidly increas-
ing towards the 30% mark, and without which the survival 
of today’s economy is difficult to fathom, has been used on 
a large industrial scale only since the 1960s. Nuclear ener-
gy’s share in electrical energy in the world is over 16%, up 
from zero as recently as the 1940s. Therefore, it seems pos-
sible that technological progress will one day allow human-
ity to replace oil with another energy source that is more 
efficient, cheaper, and perhaps renewable.
The context outlined above once more begs the question 
of what is the real motivation behind the ongoing political 
dispute over the Arctic. Are the contestants in the sym-
bolic race for the North Pole really intent on hoarding the 
vast expanses of the underwater oil reservoirs under the 
Arctic seabed—reservoirs whose extraction will not begin 
for at least several decades (and perhaps will never even 
reach that stage)? An affirmative answer to this question 
would imply that the nations involved recognize and accept 
the static resource approach championed by the Club of 
Rome and the peak oil prophets associated with it (Mead-
ows et al., 1992). It is the cautious and conservative way, 
prompted by fear for the future of energy supply and the 
potential oil-based economic profit that can be reached sev-
eral decades from now. If, however, the dynamic approach 
is chosen as a point of reference, then gaining control over 
Arctic oil is nothing more than an excuse for a race that 
shows its true colors only when viewed from a political 
perspective. Alternatively, it might be assumed that many 
decision-makers have wrong perceptions of the potential for 
oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic, and that the scram-
ble is one of the effects of their struggle to secure energy 
resources for their countries. However, it seems impossible 
to prove that qualified advisors intentionally mislead their 
patrons, so this hypothesis should be rejected.  
The central part of the Arctic is one of the last expanses 
on the planet with a still ill-defined political status. The 
Law of the Sea Convention was intended to resolve any and 
all marine conflicts, but some of its provisions leave space 
for interpretation, a fact duly noted and used by countries 
interested in expanding their possessions into the Arctic 
zone (see Łukaszuk, 2004). The region is a subject of dis-
pute because it is currently outside the jurisdiction of any 
country, and therefore, its occupation does not require war 
tactics and armed interventions. The heightened activity 
of some players, particularly Russia, can be viewed as an 
expression of imperial ambitions and the desire to realize 
them. Within the frame of the Arctic issue, Osica (2010) 
calls both Russia and Canada “Arctic warriors”. Follow-
ing the humiliating defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan in the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR, the progressive 
estrangement of the traditional Soviet sphere of influence, 
and Central and Eastern Europe’s accession to NATO and 
the European Union, Russia seems to be in search of a zone 
it could administer successfully. The political activity of 
the remaining countries can be seen in part as a knee-jerk 
reaction to Russia’s mobilization, which in turn has led to 
heightened international tension.
It is useful to note that the scramble presented in this 
paper takes place over the central part of the Arctic Ocean, 
while most oil and natural gas deposits discovered to date 
in the Arctic lie within the exclusive economic zones of 
each state (Bird et al., 2008; see also Fig. 4). It is unreason-
able to assume that any country will begin its exploitation 
of Arctic resources at the highest latitude and the greatest 
depth, extracting the least accessible reserves in the region. 
The prospect of exploiting these particular reserves is there-
fore even more distant than the several decades mentioned 
before, another reason to believe in the strictly political and 
not economic motivation behind each state’s involvement in 
the Arctic dilemma. Ingenfeld (2010) deftly called this the 
“just in case policy,” although she views the background of 
the Arctic scramble as economic. 
CONCLUSION
As stated by the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, the 
central part of the Arctic Ocean constitutes international 
waters, the resources of which are available for use by any 
country in the world. The Convention foresees the possibil-
ity of extending a state’s exclusive continental shelf from 
the standard 200 to a maximum of over 350 nautical miles 
from its baseline, provided that the coastal nation demon-
strates that its continental margin is more than 200 nauti-
cal miles wide. Some of the countries in the race for the 
FIG. 5. The price of oil relative to wages in the United States of America 
(Codrington, 2005:50). 
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Arctic are determined to use the chance to prove on geo-
logical grounds that the Lomonosov Ridge, which traverses 
the Arctic Ocean, is a direct prolongation of either Eurasia 
or North America.
The official motive for the Arctic aspirations of states 
involved in the struggle is the mineral reserves those 
nations expect to locate under the Arctic seabed. Compar-
ing and contrasting the extent of the areas potentially rich in 
oil and gas as identified in the course of research by Ameri-
can geologists (Bird et al., 2008) with the claims of each 
individual country proves beyond any reasonable doubt 
that recognizing these claims and expanding the continen-
tal shelves according to the Law of the Sea Convention will 
have little effect on the total amount of resources available 
to any given country. The reason is that most of the Arctic’s 
petroleum and natural gas reserves lie in areas that already 
form part of one or more exclusive economic zones.
Primary energy production is going through deep and 
rapid structural changes worldwide, coupled with equally 
rapid development in technology relating to the substitution 
of finite exploitable resources with generators of renewable 
energy. Although the Arctic ice sheet has been shrinking 
at an unprecedented rate in recent years, it is impossible to 
state whether the technological and economic viability of 
the undersea exploitation of Arctic resources will precede 
the unseating of petroleum and natural gas as cornerstones 
of the world’s energy network, or the other way around. It 
seems the rate of climate change is still too slow, and the 
natural gas and oil deposits currently available are still too 
rich, to warrant drilling for resources in deep Arctic waters 
in the next several decades (see Macnab et al., 2007).
Considering both the arguments given above, political 
motives for the five states attempting to gain sway in the 
Arctic appear to be much more plausible than any economic 
considerations. The Arctic does not belong to any political 
entity, which makes effective political competition over it 
all the more viable. Winning this game would do much in 
the way of satisfying the imperial ambitions of one of the 
most active players—Russia.
Whatever conclusions are reached in the future regard-
ing the Arctic, the regulations of the widely respected Law 
of the Sea Convention bar any nation from political control 
over the North Pole because of the significant distance that 
separates it from dry land masses. The only way of gain-
ing economic control over this symbolic place is to prove 
that the Lomonosov Ridge is part of a continental margin. 
The planting of the Russian flag at the bottom of the Arc-
tic Ocean can therefore be interpreted only as a symbolic 
expression of Russia’s ambitions to superpower status—
not unlike the planting of the American flag on the Moon. 
An excellent final remark on these events is that of Ole 
Kvaerno, director of the Institute of Strategy and Political 
Science in Copenhagen: “It is all surreal. It really strikes 
me that various nations have begun to make these impos-
sible territorial claims. What will be the next territorial 
claim: space?” (Anon., 2005).
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